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The Creation of an “Access Right” 
 in the Ninth Circuit’s Digital 
Copyright Jurisprudence 
INTRODUCTION 
In early 2011, a new motion-picture streaming service 
called Zediva quietly debuted, hoping to exploit a perceived 
loophole in the federal copyright law.1 The service offered to 
play movies over the Internet, streaming them directly from 
lawfully acquired DVDs it had assigned to each customer.2 
Zediva therefore maintained that it was renting those DVDs to 
its customers rather than “performing” them, as copyright law 
generally understands on-demand or streaming services to do.3 
Accordingly, Zediva argued that its use did not infringe,4 and it 
elected not to acquire the public-performance licenses that 
copyright law generally requires for such services.5 The motion-
picture studios, their paying, online licensees, and the U.S. 
District Court for the Central District of California, however, 
were not amused by this clever legal argument.6 Zediva was 
enjoined from operation within four months of its launch.7  
Digital reproduction and performance pose difficult 
analytical questions in the context of copyright-infringement 
litigation. The Zediva case is among the latest in a series of 
cases8 that demonstrate copyright law’s strained applicability 
to the digital distribution of media content. This tension may 
stem from the fact that American copyright law traces its basic 
  
 1 See Ryan Singel, Streaming Movie Service Zediva Pays Hollywood $1.8M, Shuts 
Down, WIRED.COM: THREAT LEVEL BLOG (Oct. 31, 2011 8:18 PM), http://www.wired.com/ 
threatlevel/2011/10/streaming-movie-service-zediva-pays-hollywood-1-8m-shuts-down/. 
 2 See id. 
 3 See id.; Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. WTV Sys., Inc., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 
1007 (C.D. Cal. 2011).  
 4 See infra text accompanying note 37. There was no allegation that Zediva 
was reproducing the DVDs. 
 5 Warner Bros., 824 F. Supp. 2d at 1005-08. 
 6 Id. at 1013 n.9 (“Defendants’ competition with Plaintiffs’ licensees is direct 
and intentional.”).  
 7 Id. at 1015. 
 8 See infra notes 52-62 and accompanying text. 
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contours to England during the early days of the printing 
press,9 as well as the fact that liability for infringement under 
the Copyright Act10 arises principally from the reproduction, 
distribution, or public performance11 of creative works that have 
been “fixed in any tangible medium.”12 As a result, content 
owners have increasingly called upon the courts to stretch the 
traditional rules as digital distribution technologies continue to 
shift the focus of litigation away from culpability and 
incentives and toward the threshold questions of whether a 
copy has been made or a public performance rendered.13  
Two recent lines of cases in the Ninth Circuit provide 
digital content owners a more coherent cause of action, which 
represents an alternative to reproduction- and performance-
based infringement claims.14 Under these cases, the ability to 
control access is added to the copyright holder’s existing 
exclusive rights under the Copyright Act’s liability provision, 
17 U.S.C. § 106. 
In the first line of cases, the Ninth Circuit in MDY 
Industries v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. conclusively took 
sides in a decade-long split among the Courts of Appeals over 
the proper construction of the 1998 Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act’s (DMCA) anticircumvention provisions.15 During 
the past decade or so, copyright-protected media such as 
software, movies, e-books, and song downloads have been 
commonly distributed in digital form under virtual lock and 
key.16 Accordingly, when the DMCA was enacted, it included 
three related provisions that made it unlawful to circumvent 
such measures without authority, to market technologies 
designed for that purpose, or to facilitate infringement.17 
Following the statute’s enactment, however, leading cases in 
  
 9 See DAN HUNTER, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 8-9 (2012). 
 10 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-122 (2006).  
 11 Id. § 106. This operative section also attaches prima facie infringement 
liability for the creation of certain derivative works, the public display of certain visual 
works, and the digital transmission of audio works. 
 12 Id. § 102. 
 13 See infra notes 52-64 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 15 MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 943-52 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(construing 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205). 
 16 Such protections are referred to in the legislative history of the DMCA, and 
the cases applying it, as “technological protective measures.” See infra note 93 and 
accompanying text.  
 17 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1), (a)(2) & (b)(1). To “circumvent” means to descramble, 
decrypt, or otherwise “avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure, 
without the authority of the copyright owner . . . .” Id. § 1201(a)(3)(A); see also infra note 119. 
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the Second Circuit and Federal Circuit disagreed about whether 
liability should attach under the DMCA when the act of 
circumvention is unconnected to an act of infringement under 
the Copyright Act.18 Against this background, the MDY decision 
made clear that unauthorized circumvention is a new cause of 
action protecting copyrighted works, not simply a prophylactic 
measure intended to discourage digital infringement. 
MDY was significant because disagreements about the 
DMCA’s proper relationship to infringement ran deep. 
Arguments against this kind of new intellectual property right 
governing access date back to the legislative bargaining that 
preceded the DMCA’s enactment in 1998.19 As early as 2001, 
one critic observed that the DMCA “[sought] for the first time 
to . . . make noncommercial and noninfringing behavior illegal 
on the theory that it will help prevent piracy.”20 
Anticircumvention decisions spanning the decade that 
followed have been defined by the wide variety of 
circumstances where § 1201 has been applied. Leading cases 
concern DVDs, garage-door openers (GDOs) and the online 
game World of Warcraft (WoW).21 Each litigation, moreover, is 
attended by a menagerie of interested amicus parties. These 
parties include commercial content providers who seek to 
capitalize on new technology, on the one hand, and an alliance 
of academics, content creators, consumer advocates, and 
commercial interests, on the other hand, who fear that broadly 
construed anticircumvention laws will erode traditional limits 
on copyright protection that they view as necessary to protect 
consumers and derivative artists.22 
A second line of cases clarified (at least indirectly) when 
DMCA liability would come into play. Because DMCA liability 
attaches only when access is unauthorized,23 its usefulness to 
plaintiffs who have placed an expressive work on the market 
depends on the kinds of uses those plaintiffs may deem 
  
 18 Compare Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443-44 (2d Cir. 
2001) (allowing DMCA liability absent showing of infringement), with Chamberlain 
Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (predicating 
DMCA liability on a “nexus” to an act of infringement). 
 19 For a detailed legislative history of the DMCA, see generally JESSICA 
LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 122-50 (2001). 
 20 Id. at 145. 
 21 See Corley, 273 F.3d at 435 (DVDs); Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1183 (GDOs); 
MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2010) (WoW). 
 22 See, e.g., infra note 139. 
 23 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A) (2006).  
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unauthorized.24 As a general matter, downstream control of an 
expressive work is disfavored.25 But in Apple Inc. v. Psystar 
Corp.,26 decided less than a year after MDY, the Ninth Circuit 
rejected challenges to the software industry’s “ubiquitous” 
license-based distribution model.27 The court refused to invalidate 
a contractual restraint on the use of Apple’s software because it 
found that the restraint did not constrain competition and thus 
implicate the doctrine of copyright misuse (as Psystar argued it 
did).28 In other words, the court confirmed that Apple was entitled 
to contractually alienate a customized set of entitlements to 
access or use its software in whatever way Apple thought best. 
Read together, these two lines of cases validate a 
contractual and statutory ordering that allows efficient, 
tailored, access-based digital content transactions, and they 
protect that mechanism with a copyright-based cause of action 
that avoids the tortured analysis required by infringement 
claims like those brought in the Zediva case. The resulting legal 
regime reflects a heretofore theoretical vision of the copyright 
law that has been termed an “access right,” proposed by scholars 
who posit that online-content consumers increasingly care about 
experiencing works rather than owning copies of them.29 As 
consumer content moves to the “cloud,”30 where the distinction 
between a copy and a performance is more likely to be invisible 
to the consumer, this access-based approach to protecting 
creative works provides an alternative to traditional 
infringement claims that is both more workable and better 
suited to the digital marketplace.31 As this happens, the reach of 
  
 24 See infra note 171 and accompanying text.  
 25 See infra note 244 and accompanying text. 
 26 Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2011). The court relied 
heavily on its prior decision in Vernor v. Autodesk, 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010). See 
Psystar, 658 F.3d at 1155-59. 
 27 Psystar, 658 F.3d at 1155, 1159; see also infra Part I.B.  
 28 Psystar, 658 F.3d at 1159-60.  
 29 See generally, e.g., ZOHAR EFRONI, ACCESS-RIGHT: THE FUTURE OF DIGITAL 
COPYRIGHT LAW (2011) (presenting a detailed positive and normative analysis of the 
right); Jane C. Ginsburg, Essay: From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: the 
Development of an Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 
113, 115-16 (2003) (providing a prediction about the trend toward an access right in 
existing law following the enactment of the DMCA). The term is used in this note as 
Professors Ginsburg and Efroni use it: to mean the exclusive right enjoyed by copyright 
holders, as opposed to a right of access on the part of content consumers. 
 30 “The general idea of the ‘cloud’ is to store your media on the internet so you can 
access it from any device anywhere, as opposed to leaving it on a hard drive.” Brian X. Chen, 
From iCloud to Dropbox: 5 Cloud Services Compared, WIRED.COM: GADGET LAB (June 20, 
2011, 3:05 PM), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2011/06/cloud-services-compared/.  
 31 See infra notes 184-87 and accompanying text. 
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the DMCA must be tempered by the same kinds of limitations 
that have traditionally shaped § 106 infringement liability.32  
The descriptive aim of this note is twofold. Part I 
examines Psystar and MDY in the broader context of digital 
copyright infringement jurisprudence, focusing on these cases’ 
impact in extending legal relief to a category of conduct I will 
call unauthorized noninfringing use in a variety of content 
markets. Part II posits that as the physical situs of a digital 
copy becomes increasingly invisible to the consumer, Psystar 
and MDY can be read together as a successful attempt to moot 
the most difficult interpretive questions about infringement 
while providing an alternative regime of protection like the one 
contemplated by the “access right” literature. As a normative 
matter, this part will urge plaintiffs and courts to embrace this 
cause of action in the digital context but to preserve traditional 
infringement liability for those factual settings where it 
remains coherent. Finally, Part III examines common concerns 
raised by an access-protection regime and calls for legitimizing 
limits on the statutory monopoly that the DMCA grants over 
expressive works. It finds them in Psystar’s recognition of the 
nascent copyright misuse doctrine, and calls for further judicial 
development of that doctrine. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Evolution of Digital Copyright 
No author is obliged to place her work into the 
marketplace, but copyright law is concerned with the 
limitations that may be placed on it once it is there.33 In the 
United States, copyright law is governed by the Copyright Act 
of 1976.34 The Act finds its constitutional support in the 
Progress Clause, which empowers Congress “to promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”35 Liability for 
infringement under the Copyright Act is governed by § 106, 
  
 32 See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 29, at 125 (“Even granting that an access right 
is a Good Thing, is it nonetheless too much of one, at least as implemented by the DMCA?”). 
 33 Randal C. Picker, Fair Use v. Fair Access, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 603, 605-
06 (2008).  
 34 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-122 (2006). 
 35 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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which grants to the owner of a copyright36 the exclusive right 
“(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work . . . ; (3) to distribute 
copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by 
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or 
lending; [and] (4) . . . to perform the copyrighted work 
publicly . . . .”37 Perhaps equally as important, these grants of 
exclusivity are limited in scope by other provisions of the Act. 
Under § 107, a variety of conduct that would otherwise be 
infringing under § 106 constitutes “fair use” and is exempted 
from liability.38 Under § 109, which codifies the “first sale 
doctrine,” once a copy of a work is lawfully acquired, its further 
sale or transfer cannot be restrained by the copyright owner.39 
This tension between the Act’s exclusive rights and its statutory 
exclusions forms the contours of what has been called a “bargain” 
between authors and a public that “trades certain freedoms [to 
use the work] in exchange for more public works to enjoy.”40 
Against this statutory background, copyright has 
continued to evolve to keep pace with media distribution 
technologies.41 Under the 1976 Copyright Act, copyright 
protection was explicitly extended to works that require the 
assistance of a machine (such as a turntable or DVD player) to 
experience.42 In more recent decades, photocopiers and 
  
 36 The owner of a copyright might be the author of an expressive work or her 
assignee. See 17 U.S.C. § 201.  
 37 Id. § 106 (emphasis added). The remaining exclusive rights granted 
include: “(2) to prepare derivative works . . . ; (5) . . . to display the copyrighted work 
publicly; and (6) . . . to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital 
audio transmission.” Notably, possessing and accessing a work without authorization 
are absent from the list of conduct proscribed by the statute. 
 38 Id. § 107; see also Picker, supra note 33, at 605 (emphasizing that fair use 
provides an affirmative defense to otherwise infringing conduct, rather than “some 
broad ‘right’ to fair use”).  
 39 17 U.S.C. § 109 (“[T]he owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully 
made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the 
authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that 
copy or phonorecord.”) (codifying the doctrine established in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. 
Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908)). 
 40 Richard Stallman, Reevaluating Copyright: The Public Must Prevail, 75 
OR. L. REV. 291, 292 (1996) (adding skeptically that “in practice, usually publishers 
take over the authors’ part of the bargain”). The Supreme Court has held that “[t]he 
rights of a . . . copyright holder are part of a ‘carefully crafted bargain’ . . . .” Dastar 
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33-34 (2003) (refusing to 
extend trademark protection to content of documentary film series after the expiration 
of its copyright).  
 41 See HUNTER, supra note 9, at 48-49; Ginsburg, supra note 29, at 114-16. 
 42 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “[c]opies” as “material objects . . . in which a work 
is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a 
machine or device”); see also, generally, JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL 
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magnetic media, such as audio- and video-cassette tapes, made 
home reproduction of copyright-protected works accessible to 
the average consumer.43 The U.S. Supreme Court’s Magna 
Carta for consumer reproduction was the “Betamax case,”44 in 
which television-studio plaintiffs alleged that Sony was liable 
for contributory infringement when it marketed and sold 
Betamax home-video recorders that facilitated reproduction of 
their broadcasts.45 The Court held that a manufacturer of a 
consumer recording device capable of “substantial noninfringing 
uses” is exempt from vicarious infringement liability even if the 
device may also be used by third parties to make infringing 
reproductions.46 The Court then held that consumer use of a VCR 
to “time-shift” a television broadcast by reproducing it onto a 
VHS tape to watch later constitutes a noninfringing “fair use” 
of a copyright-protected work.47 Because fair use is legally 
considered noninfringing, the Court held that the substantial-
noninfringing-use requirement was met on the facts before it.48 
The home reproduction of the 1980s has since gone 
online, raising more and harder questions. Famously, for 
example, the Supreme Court distinguished the Betamax case 
in the context of internet file-sharing networks designed 
specifically to profit from users’ infringement.49 In Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., the Court held 
that, unlike the Sony defendants, “one who distributes a device 
with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as 
shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to 
foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of 
infringement by third parties.”50 The Court also noted evidence 
that the software-based reproduction technology at issue, 
  
INFORMATION ECONOMY 24-27 (2d ed. 2006) (describing “Legal Responses to New 
Technologies” culminating in the 1976 Copyright Act). 
 43 See Ginsburg, supra note 29, at 114 (observing that “perhaps the most 
significant post-printing press technological event for copyright law was the 
development of mass market audio- and then video-copying devices, because these 
devices enabled end-users to create physical copies out of previously ephemeral radio 
and television transmissions.”).  
 44 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); see, 
e.g., Peter S. Menell, Indirect Copyright Liability and Technological Innovation, 32 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 375, 376 (2009) (citing, among others, Professors Randall Picker, 
Jessica Litman, and Pamela Samuelson). 
 45 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 419-20. 
 46 Id. at 442. 
 47 Id. at 453-55 (applying 17 U.S.C. § 107). 
 48 Id.  
 49 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 918 (2005) 
(reversing summary judgment in favor of defendant peer-to-peer file-sharing website).  
 50 Id. at 919. 
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unlike a Betamax, was capable of facilitating infringement on a 
“gigantic scale.”51 
Copyright infringement cases in the digital era can be 
distinguished not only by malice or scale but also by analytical 
formalism. In the on-demand broadcast and streaming contexts, 
recent infringement case law has hinged on the ontological 
question of whether and what kind of electronic copies of a work 
exist on the defendant’s server. By way of example, the success of 
a content owner’s attempt to enforce reproduction and 
performance rights in digitally recorded works can turn on factual 
details as nuanced as whether a defendant broadcaster employs a 
single “master copy” in the transmission of on-demand 
programming.52 This analysis, grounded in the language of the 
Copyright Act, means that the method an intermediary uses to 
store its works will impact its liability for infringement. 
Unsurprisingly, jurisdictional splits regarding the specifics 
have emerged.  
In Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc.,53 the 
Second Circuit examined defendant Cablevision’s “RS-DVR” 
system, which customers could use to record and play back the 
plaintiffs’ television broadcasts from a remote server.54 Content 
providers sought to recover on theories of direct infringement.55 
The court held that Cablevision’s customer-initiated 
transmissions of customer-made copies of such broadcasts were 
not performances to the public.56 
The court accepted Cablevision’s argument that “because 
each RS–DVR transmission is made using a single unique copy 
of a work . . . that can be decoded exclusively by that subscriber’s 
cable box, only one subscriber is capable of receiving any given 
  
 51 Id. at 940. 
 52 Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3Tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 649 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 53 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 54 Id. at 124. 
 55 Id. (“Critically for our analysis here, plaintiffs alleged theories only of direct 
infringement, not contributory infringement . . . .”); see also id. at 139-40 (emphasizing 
that its holding did not “generally permit content delivery networks to avoid all copyright 
liability by making copies of each item of content and associating one unique copy with 
each subscriber to the network, or by giving their subscribers the capacity to make their 
own individual copies” because vicarious liability might still attach).  
 56 Id. at 134. The court also held that Cablevision’s (approximately) one-
second buffering of the plaintiffs’ broadcast transmission was “transitory,” that is, not a 
fixation of sufficient duration to constitute unauthorized copying. Id. at 129-30. As to 
the copies that were made on Cablevision’s RS-DVR servers when customers recorded a 
show, the court held that Cablevision’s conduct (unlike that of its customers) lacked the 
volitional element of direct infringement. Id. at 131-32.  
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RS–DVR transmission.”57 This meant that its transmission was 
not made to the public under the “transmit clause” of § 101,58 
which, the court noted, “directs us to consider the potential 
audience of a given transmission.”59 The court then held that 
“because the RS–DVR system, as designed, only makes 
transmissions to one subscriber using a copy made by that 
subscriber, . . . the universe of people capable of receiving an 
RS–DVR transmission is the single subscriber whose self-made 
copy is used to create that transmission.”60 
In Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3Tunes, L.L.C., the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York followed 
and refined Cartoon Network when it held that a “virtual 
locker” service provider was not directly liable for infringement 
on the basis of a public performance because it “d[id] not use a 
‘master copy’ to store or play back songs stored in its lockers”61 
but, rather, “use[d] a standard data compression algorithm 
that eliminate[d] redundant digital data.”62 
But in the Zediva case, in contrast, the U.S. District 
Court for the Central District of California held that the 
defendant streaming service was publicly performing the works 
it played back to customers from individual DVDs (which it had 
purchased).63 The court held that these transmissions were “‘to the 
public’ because the relationship between Defendants . . . and the 
audience . . . is a commercial, ‘public’ relationship regardless of 
where the viewing takes place.”64 
  
 57 Id. at 135. 
 58 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“To perform or display a work ‘publicly’ means (1) to perform 
or display it . . . or (2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of 
the work . . . to the public . . . .”). This definitional clause governs liability via § 106. 
 59 Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 135. 
 60 Id. at 137. As Jeffrey Malkan explains the case,  
[t]he studios needed to convince the court that RS-DVR is a type of [video on 
demand, or VOD] and hence subject to their public performance right. The 
challenge that Cablevision faced was . . . . to convince the court that[, unlike 
VOD,] RS-DVR would not give rise to public performances because each RS-
DVR transmission would emanate from a distinct copy.  
Jeffrey Malkan, The Public Performance Problem in Cartoon Network LP v. CSC 
Holdings, Inc., 89 OR. L. REV. 505, 522 (2010). 
 61 Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3Tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 650 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. WTV Sys., Inc., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1010 
(C.D. Cal. 2011). 
 64 Id.; see also id. at 1011-12 & n.7. The court relied on On Command Video 
Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1991). That case was 
disagreed with and distinguished by Cartoon Network, the decision on which 
MP3Tunes relied.  
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Infringement analysis in the context of computer 
software is more complex yet, since the individual use of most 
software requires temporary duplication of the work into the 
computer’s random access memory (RAM).65 Thus, theoretically, 
each use of a particular copy of a software program temporarily 
creates another copy, implicating the reproduction right of 
§ 106.66 In response to this idiosyncrasy, Congress enacted the 
“essential step” defense, under which a user may avoid liability 
during routine use of the software.67 But Congress afforded 
protection only to RAM copies made by owners of a copy of the 
copyrighted program, leaving unprotected those made by a 
software licensee.68 As a result, the question of whether a 
software copyright has been infringed by routine use becomes 
simply the question of whether the defendant owned or has 
licensed the copy of the software and, if licensed, whether the 
defendant’s use was contractually authorized. 
In sum, the marriage of digital content distribution and 
traditional copyright law gives rise to a set of interpretive 
questions that have shifted the focus of copyright litigation 
from the culpability of the defendant’s conduct or the incentives 
animating the copyright bargain69 to the technological 
formalism of reproduction and performance. Moreover, the 
application of the RAM copy doctrine has given rise to legal 
standards that differ on the basis of a technological quirk. To 
begin explaining how the Ninth Circuit has enacted a viable 
alternative premised on access, the next sections will examine 
that court’s recent decisions governing technological protective 
measures (TPMs) and software license agreements (SLAs) in 
the context of DVDs, GDOs, and WoW.70  
  
 65 See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518-19 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 66 See id. at 518 (holding that “[defendant’s] loading of copyrighted software 
into RAM creates a ‘copy’ of that software in violation of the Copyright Act”). 
 67 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2006) (Notwithstanding § 106, it is permissible for “the 
owner of a copy of a computer program to make . . . another copy or adaptation of that 
computer program provided . . . that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an 
essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine 
and that it is used in no other manner . . . .”).  
 68 Id.; see also Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1109-10 (9th Cir. 
2010) (explaining MAI Systems and emphasizing that under § 117, licensees are not 
entitled to the exception). 
 69 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 70 See supra note 21. 
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B. The Licensing Cases 
Computer software transactions generally do not 
involve the purchase of a copy of certain software but rather 
the purchase of a license to use a copy of the software.71 The 
terms of the license, of course, set forth the permissible uses of 
the copy. At the most basic level, the transaction is not unique 
to digital media. In video stores and libraries, a fee is paid (or 
perhaps a borrower has paid taxes) in exchange for the right to 
take possession of a tangible copy of a work. Appurtenant to 
the right to possess this chattel, it is understood, is a more or 
less unfettered right to access and enjoy the creative work 
recorded thereon. Also accompanying the copy is the right to 
make fair use reproductions, performances, and the like. The 
terms of the rental as well as personal property law place 
limits on possession of the copy; copyright law places extrinsic 
limits on the use of the work.  
Software makers, in particular, like distributing their 
work under license because the RAM copy doctrine makes each 
unauthorized use a prima facie infringement; this means that 
downstream control can be enforced by contract, although 
consumers have resisted such control. In Vernor v. Autodesk, 
Inc., defendant Timothy Vernor (acting privately) purchased 
unused, sealed CD-ROM copies of plaintiff Autodesk’s design 
software from an Autodesk customer and resold them through 
an online-auction website.72 The court found that the software 
product at issue had been distributed pursuant to a software 
license agreement that barred resale.73 This carried two legal 
consequences: Vernor had infringed the plaintiff’s exclusive 
distribution right and, at the same time, had contributed to his 
customers’ infringement of its exclusive reproduction right by 
making RAM copies when they used the software.74 Had 
Vernor, his supplier, and his customers all owned the software 
he resold, he would have been protected from all such liability 
by affirmative defenses.75 But the court articulated his trouble 
with useful clarity: 
  
 71 Brief of Amicus Curiae Business Software Alliance in Support of Appellees 
and Cross-Appellants Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. and Vivendi Games, Inc. Seeking 
Affirmance at 20-28, MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(Nos. 09-15932 & 09-16044), 2009 WL 5538916. 
 72 Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1103. 
 73 Id. at 1103-04. 
 74 Id. 
 75 See supra notes 39, 67 and accompanying text. 
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The exclusive distribution right is limited by the first sale doctrine, 
an affirmative defense to copyright infringement that allows owners 
of copies of copyrighted works to resell those copies. The exclusive 
reproduction right is limited within the software context by the 
essential step defense, another affirmative defense to copyright 
infringement . . . . Both of these affirmative defenses are unavailable to 
those who are only licensed to use their copies of copyrighted works.76  
Liability of both forms thus hinged on whether Vernor’s 
supplier had, itself, purchased or licensed the software in the 
first place.77 Vernor argued that his supplier owned its copies 
because, essentially, the characteristics of Autodesk’s initial 
transaction were those of a sale.78 Distilling its own and other 
relevant precedent, the court established “three considerations 
that . . . determine whether a software user is a licensee, rather 
than an owner of a copy.”79 The resulting test asks whether the 
copyright owner “(1) specifies that the user is granted a license; 
(2) significantly restricts the user’s ability to transfer the 
software; and (3) imposes notable use restrictions.”80 The court 
held that Vernor’s supplier had been a licensee, and that he 
and his customers were not entitled to the first sale or essential 
step defenses.81 
Neither the district court nor the Ninth Circuit in Vernor 
reached the question of whether Autodesk’s SLA constituted 
copyright misuse.82 That question was taken up again in 
Psystar.83 In that case, the defendant computer manufacturer 
purchased unopened DVD copies of Apple’s “OS X” operating 
system software,84 installed it on competing hardware products, 
and sold it to consumers in violation of the Apple SLA.85 Psystar 
  
 76 Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1107. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 1113-14. 
 79 Id. at 1110. 
 80 Id. at 1111. 
 81 Id. at 1116. 
 82 Id. at 1115-16. 
 83 Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 84 The medium on which the software was delivered (and thus, necessarily, 
the distinction between Apple’s DVD and Autodesk’s CD-ROM) was immaterial to 
these cases. The Psystar court, for example, found that “buyers of that DVD purchased 
the disc. They knew, however, they were not buying the software. Apple’s SLA clearly 
explained this.” 658 F.3d at 1159.  
 85 Id. at 1153. Defendant Psystar provided an unopened copy of the Apple 
software with each system sold, allowing it (like the similarly creative Zediva 
defendants) to maintain that it had purchased a copy. Id. In fact, the computer was running 
on an altered version of the Apple software which circumvented Apple’s technological self-
defense mechanism. Id. Private users appear still to embrace the use of OS X in this manner. 
See generally OSx86 Project, INSANELYMAC, http://www.insanelymac.com/forum/forum/85-
osx86-project/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2012). 
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did not appeal the lower court’s finding of prima facie 
infringement but argued that Apple’s claim was barred by the 
misuse doctrine,86 which the court described as a judge-made 
affirmative defense to § 106 liability aimed at “preventing 
holders of copyrights from leveraging their limited monopoly to 
allow them control over areas outside the monopoly.”87  
Applying Vernor, the court held that § 109 did not 
preserve the right of customers to resell software that had been 
licensed rather than sold, and that the distinction between 
sales and licenses was “well established.”88 The court examined 
the development of copyright misuse and held that it should be 
applied “sparingly” and only in situations where license terms 
restricted the use or development of competing products.89 
Otherwise, under “firmly rooted” principles of copyright law—
such as those governing theatrical film prints—copies could be 
licensed and the terms of those licenses “may reasonably 
restrict” a licensee’s use.90 The court held that the license 
restrictions at bar were not of the kind that would trigger 
copyright misuse.91 This holding’s negative implications—that is, 
the scope of restrictions that do constitute copyright misuse—
remain to be determined.92 This note argues that this unsettled 
copyright misuse doctrine is the key to the coherence of the 
Ninth Circuit’s anticircumvention jurisprudence. We turn next, 
however, to the DMCA and its various judicial constructions. 
C. The Circuit Split over Anticircumvention 
1. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
The DMCA contains three operative provisions concerned 
with circumvention of technological protective measures.93 Under 
  
 86 Psystar, 658 F.3d at 1152. 
 87 Id. at 1157 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 88 Id. at 1156. 
 89 Id. at 1157. 
 90 Id. at 1159.  
 91 Id. at 1160 (holding that “Apple’s SLA . . . represents the legitimate exercise 
of a copyright holder’s right to conditionally transfer works of authorship, and does not 
constitute copyright misuse.”). 
 92 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Psystar, 658 F.3d 1150 (No. 11-812), 
available at 2011 WL 6934738, at *9 (Dec. 27, 2011). Certiorari was denied. 132 S. Ct. 
2374 (2012). 
 93 The term “technological protective measures” appears in the legislative 
history, but not the text, of the DMCA. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006); MDY Indus. v. 
Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 947 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 12 
(1998)). TPM are also “commonly referred to as digital rights management (DRM).” Aaron 
Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889, 902-03 (2011). 
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the first, § 1201(a)(1), “No person shall circumvent a 
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work 
protected under this title.”94 Moreover, under § 1201(a)(2), “No 
person shall . . . traffic in any technology . . . that . . . is 
primarily designed or produced for the purpose of 
circumventing” the same.95 These paired provisions target the 
same species of circumvention by creating liability for the act of 
circumvention itself and for trafficking in a facilitating 
technology, respectively. The third operative anticircumvention 
provision, § 1201(b)(1), targets conduct bearing a subtle, yet 
important, difference:  
No person shall . . . traffic in any technology, product, service, device, 
component, or part thereof, that . . . is primarily designed or 
produced for the purpose of circumventing protection afforded by a 
technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright 
owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof . . . .96  
On its face, therefore, § 1201 has distinct provisions targeting 
access, on one hand, and copying (or perhaps performance), on 
the other. 
When the DMCA was enacted, the known universe of 
TPMs included copy-protection technologies that did not impact 
access, as well as access-protection measures.97 Scholars have 
assumed that copy-protection technologies were the focus of 
§ 1201(b) because to “protect[] a right of a copyright owner” in 
large part means, it can be argued, to prevent copying.98 Courts 
have agreed,99 reasoning also that because Congress intended 
§ 1201(b) to target only technologies that can (or do) facilitate 
§ 106 violations, an additional statutory prohibition on the 
  
 94 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
 95 Id. § 1201(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 
 96 Id. § 1201(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
 97 See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: 
Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
519, 534-35 (1999). For the purposes of this note, measures that only restrict copying 
will be referred to as copy-protection.  
 98 See, e.g., LITMAN, supra note 19, at 136 & n.18; see also id. at 143-44 
(noting that § 1201(b), concerned with copy-protection technology, “did not prohibit 
individual consumers’ circumvention of copy-protection technology—that is, measures 
that prevent infringement of the copyright in a work. Individuals may still, if their 
purpose is otherwise lawful, devise a trick to defeat Macrovision, [a technology] which 
seeks to prevent copying of commercial videotapes”). 
 99 See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 441 (2d Cir. 
2001) (explaining that “the focus of subsection 1201(a)(2) is circumvention of 
technologies designed to prevent access to a work, and the focus of subsection 1201(b)(1) 
is circumvention of technologies designed to permit access to a work but prevent 
copying of the work or some other act that infringes a copyright” (citing S. REP. NO. 
105-190, at 11-12 (1998))). 
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underlying act would have been redundant.100 For these 
reasons, § 1201(b) is not generally viewed as having created a 
new kind of right for copyright owners. In contrast, it was the 
interpretation of § 1201(a)—the access provision—that drove 
DMCA litigation for more than a decade. The next section 
turns to its first judicial construction.  
2. The Second Circuit’s Interpretation of § 1201(a) in Corley 
While the former has been the provision principally in 
dispute, the distinction in language between § 1201(a) and 
1201(b) remains central to the debate over the DMCA’s 
relationship to infringement. The twin provisions of § 1201(a) 
are concerned with protective measures that “control access to a 
work,” while § 1201(b) is concerned with protective measures 
that “protect the rights of a copyright owner.”101 These provisions 
did not have to wait long for judicial construction. In 2001, a 
group of motion-picture studios filed suit against Eric Corley, 
the publisher of a software-industry magazine, alleging that he 
had violated the DMCA by trafficking in a circumvention 
technology when he published the source code for a 
controversial decryption program devised by a Norwegian 
hacker.102 The program’s operation was surprisingly mundane. 
The DVD format was governed by a licensing body made up of 
movie studios, electronics companies, and other stakeholders.103 
An encryption technology called CSS ensured that 
commercially produced DVDs would play back only on licensed 
devices like store-bought DVD players and computers running 
approved software.104 The circumvention technology at issue, a 
computer program aptly called DeCSS, allowed home users to 
remove this encryption.105 To be clear, this was not a copy-
protection technology; in fact, DVDs encrypted with CSS could 
readily be duplicated using commercially available equipment 
  
 100 See, e.g., Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 
1195 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing S. REP. NO. 105-90 at 12 (1998)) (conceding that within the 
four corners of the statute, “[t]he prohibition in 1201(a)(1) [was] necessary because 
prior to [the DMCA], the conduct of circumvention was never before made unlawful. 
The device limitation in 1201(a)(2) enforces this new prohibition in conduct. The 
copyright law has long forbidden copyright infringements, so no new prohibition was 
necessary. The device limitation in 1201(b) enforces the longstanding prohibitions on 
infringements” (third alteration in original)). 
 101 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)-(b) (emphasis added). 
 102 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 435-39 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 103 Id. at 436-37. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 437-38. 
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with their encryption intact.106 Thus, CSS was not effective self-
help against duplication or public performance, the actions 
which § 106 prohibits. In other words, all DeCSS did was to 
allow DVDs to be privately viewed on unlicensed platforms like 
laptop computers.107 Corley reprinted the code for DeCSS on his 
web site, giving rise to the suit.108 Although there was no 
evidence in the record that the software in question had been 
used to facilitate infringement, it was clear that content 
providers feared the worst.109 
Corley and his company argued that “an individual who 
buys a DVD has the ‘authority of the copyright owner’ to view 
the DVD, and therefore is exempted from the DMCA pursuant 
to § 1201(a)(3)(A) when the buyer circumvents an encryption 
technology in order to view the DVD on a competing 
platform . . . .”110 The Second Circuit rejected this argument and 
held that the DMCA more narrowly “exempts from liability 
those who would ‘decrypt’ an encrypted DVD with the 
authority of a copyright owner, not those who would ‘view’ a 
DVD with the authority of a copyright owner.”111 In effect, this 
confirmed that the DMCA conferred a new right of exclusion; 
alongside the right to exclude others from reproducing and 
performing works, copyright owners now had the means to 
place content into the market with mutually supportive 
technological and legal controls on its private use. 
  
 106 See WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 166-67 (2009). 
 107 Corley, 273 F.3d at 437-38. 
 108 Id. at 439-40. 
 109 Id. at 442 (adopting lower court’s finding that “DeCSS was harming the 
[content providers], not only because they were now exposed to the possibility of piracy 
and therefore were obliged to develop costly new safeguards for DVDs, but also 
because, even if there was only indirect evidence that DeCSS availability actually 
facilitated DVD piracy, the threat of piracy was very real, particularly as Internet 
transmission speeds continue to increase” (footnote omitted)). 
 110 Id. at 444. 
 111 Id. 
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3. The Federal Circuit’s Interpretation in the “Durable 
Goods” Cases112 
In Corley, the Second Circuit was clear that 
anticircumvention created a new right of content creators to 
control access, reaching conduct well beyond the scope of § 106. 
Several years later, in a somewhat different context, the 
Federal Circuit disagreed. In Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. 
Skylink Technologies, Inc.,113 a manufacturer of garage-door 
openers alleged that a competitor had violated the DMCA by 
marketing a universal remote. The remote was allegedly 
programmed to bypass a simple antitheft code in the 
electronics that ran the plaintiff’s product.114 In doing so, it 
allegedly accessed the plaintiff’s copyright-protected software.115 
The Chamberlain court expressed concern that a construction 
of the DMCA expansive enough to reach such facts would allow 
durable goods manufacturers to use copyright law to limit the 
interoperability of their products with those of competitors.116 
“In other words, [plaintiff’s] construction of the DMCA would 
allow virtually any company to attempt to leverage its sales 
into aftermarket monopolies—a practice that both the antitrust 
laws and the doctrine of copyright misuse normally prohibit.”117 
The court then held that liability under the anticircumvention 
provisions required a “nexus” to a violation of § 106.118 In the 
technical sense, this statement was dicta, because the court’s 
only necessary holding was that the use at issue was not, 
  
 112 This popular label for Chamberlain and its companion cases seems to have 
been coined in Daniel C. Higgs, Note, Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control 
Components, Inc. & Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc.: The DMCA 
and Durable Goods Aftermarkets, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 59 (2004), although the 
origins of the phrase are difficult to reconstruct and attribution may also be due 
elsewhere; see also Timothy K. Armstrong, Fair Circumvention, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 
15 (2008) (discussed infra).  
 113 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 114 Id. at 1191. 
 115 Id. at 1186. The protection measure at issue used an encryption system 
designed principally to prevent burglary. Its technical function is inapposite to this 
discussion; it is sufficient for these purposes to note that the court found that it was a TPM.  
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 1201 (citations omitted). The court did not discuss the contours of the 
doctrine. 
 118 Id. at 1204. The scope and contours of the required “nexus” were left 
somewhat open-ended and have since been debated. See generally, e.g., Zoe Argento, 
Interpreting Chamberlain’s “Reasonable Relation” Between Access and Infringement in 
the Digital Mill, 2008 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 102902 (2008) (examining six 
possible definitions). 
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legally speaking, unauthorized.119 The court held that 
Chamberlain Group, the plaintiff, had “failed to show not only 
the requisite lack of authorization, but also . . . the critical 
nexus between access and protection.”120 The Federal Circuit 
thereby reached beyond the facts before it in order to confront 
Corley and effectively held that an unauthorized noninfringing 
use would remain beyond the reach of the DMCA.121  
4. Anticircumvention Meets Licensing in MDY v. Blizzard 
In MDY, the plaintiff Blizzard Entertainment was the 
maker of the popular online game World of Warcraft.122 The 
defendant programmer marketed a piece of software called 
Glider, which allowed players to advance through the game’s 
levels automatically, giving them a comparative advantage 
over other online players.123 According to Blizzard’s allegations, 
the use of Glider by players gave rise to hundreds of thousands 
of complaints by honest players, which in turn imposed annual 
costs approaching one million dollars.124 Blizzard therefore 
developed and deployed a protective technology known as 
Warden, which scanned user hard drives for signs of Glider and 
detected its use during online play.125 MDY modified Glider to 
evade such detection.126 Claiming that the sale of this modified 
version of Glider constituted trafficking in a circumvention 
  
 119 Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Tech., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1187-88, 1204 
(Fed. Cir. 2004); see 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A) (2006) (“[T]o ‘circumvent a technological 
measure’ means to . . . avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological 
measure, without the authority of the copyright owner . . . .” (emphasis added)). Because 
the court found no evidence that Skylink’s customers were not authorized by 
Chamberlain to use universal remotes, the prima facie case under § 1201(a) would have 
been defeated even without a need to show a nexus to infringement.  
 120 Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1204 (emphasis added). 
 121 No other circuit has expressly adopted a “nexus” requirement, but other 
“durable goods” cases have found similar means by which to reject DMCA claims 
against unauthorized, noninfringing uses. See generally Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static 
Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding that printer 
manufacturer failed to make prima facie case of circumvention against competing toner 
manufacturer); MGE UPS Sys., Inc. v. GE Consumer & Indus., 95 U.S.P.Q.2d 1632, 
1635 (2010), withdrawn and superseded on reh’g, 622 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(adopting Chamberlain’s approach in an opinion that was subsequently redrawn on 
other grounds). As the MDY court later noted, “[the] revised opinion [in MGE] avoids 
the issue by determining that MGE had not shown circumvention of its software 
protections. Notably, the revised opinion does not cite Chamberlain.” MDY Indus. v. 
Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 948 n.11 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 122 MDY, 629 F.3d at 935. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at 935-36. 
 125 Id. at 936. 
 126 Id. 
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technology, Blizzard alleged that MDY had violated § 106 of the 
Copyright Act and § 1201(a)(2) and 1201(b)(1) of the DMCA.127  
The Ninth Circuit first addressed Blizzard’s claim that 
selling Glider constituted contributory copyright infringement.128 
This depended on whether MDY’s customers, by using Glider, 
infringed Blizzard’s copyright in certain elements of the game in 
violation of § 106.129 The parties did not dispute the fact that the 
act of installing and playing the game caused a RAM copy to be 
made, constituting a prima facie violation of § 106.130 Thus, 
Blizzard argued, MDY was liable unless users were acting 
within the scope of a valid end-user license agreement (EULA), 
in which case the reproduction was authorized, or if they 
owned their copies, in which case they were entitled to the 
essential step defense.131  
Thus, the three-part Vernor test was central to the 
question of infringement.132 The court accepted Blizzard’s 
argument that its customers were licensees (and not owners) of 
the game software under Vernor.133 This meant that MDY could 
not avail itself of the essential step defense and thus could 
avoid liability only if the use of Glider was within the scope of 
the EULA.134 In a move that may have surprised both parties, 
however, the court found that although using Glider 
  
 127 Id. at 937.  
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 937-38 (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 
545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005)) (“MDY is liable for vicarious infringement if it (1) has the 
right and ability to control Glider users’ putatively infringing activity and (2) derives a 
direct financial benefit from their activity. If Glider users directly infringe, MDY does 
not dispute that it satisfies the other elements of contributory and vicarious 
infringement.” (citation omitted)). 
 130 Id. at 938. 
 131 Id.; see also supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 132 MDY, 629 F.3d at 938; see also supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 133 Amici for both parties hotly contested the question of whether Vernor 
applied. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Public Knowledge in Support of Reversal at 1, 
MDY, 629 F.3d 928 (“If successful, Blizzard’s attempt to use a boilerplate ‘license’ to 
sidestep Congress’s carefully balanced consumer protections laid out in 17 U.S.C. § 117 
will change a legal framework which protects lawful owners of copyrighted software 
into one which lets software developers subject users to copyright infringement 
penalties long after a lawful purchase has occurred.”). Amici speaking for the software 
industry urged the court to follow Vernor in viewing its customers as licensees. See, 
e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Business Software Alliance in Support of Appellees and 
Cross-Appellants Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. and Vivendi Games, Inc. Seeking 
Affirmance at 20-28, MDY, 629 F.3d 928 (explaining the benefits of its license-based 
distribution model to all market participants). It illustrates the complexity of 
stakeholder interests in a case like MDY that in other contexts, such as the calculation 
of music royalties, copyright owners have incentives to argue that a purely online 
transaction constitutes a sale. See, e.g., F.B.T. Prods., LLC v. Aftermath Records, 621 
F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 134 MDY, 629 F.3d at 939. 
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constituted a contractual violation, it was a violation of an 
independent contractual covenant and not of a license 
condition.135 As such, the breach of the EULA in using Glider 
was not sufficiently connected to the licensor’s exclusive rights 
under § 106 to give rise to infringement liability.136 In other 
words, the court found that while the use of Glider to play 
World of Warcraft violates a player’s contract with Blizzard, it 
is not an infringement of Blizzard’s copyright. By so finding, 
the court placed Glider on a unique footing with respect to 
Blizzard’s principal claim that using Glider constituted 
unlawful circumvention under the DMCA. Ironically, had 
Blizzard convinced the court that Glider users violated its 
copyright, the Chamberlain nexus question would never have 
been reached, since there is little question that an act of 
circumvention which actually facilitates infringement is 
punishable under the DMCA.137 Instead, however, the court 
thought big. By applying Vernor but accepting MDY’s 
covenant–condition distinction to support a finding of 
noninfringement, the court framed the facts as unauthorized 
noninfringing use.138 It thus reached the central inquiry of 
Chamberlain (concerned with operating software) and Corley 
(concerned with entertainment media) in the context of 
consumer software. 
The stakes in MDY thus reached beyond the facts at bar 
to address the legal validity of the Chamberlain nexus 
requirement, and the litigation drew the attention of amici 
accordingly.139 Content providers were adamant that the DMCA 
be construed in a way that would “encourage copyright owners 
to make their works available for distribution, viewing and/or 
listening online and in new digital formats.”140 Studios, it was 
argued, had come to depend on a business model where access 
could be provided online in exchange for a payment: 
Someone who circumvents access controls to watch those movies for 
free violates section 1201(a)(1)—even if circumvention does not 
facilitate copying because, for example, copy controls remain in 
  
 135 Id. at 939-41 (relying on principles of contract law). 
 136 Id. at 941. 
 137 See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text. 
 138 See generally infra Part II.B. 
 139 Amicus briefs were filed in the case by the Business Software Alliance, the 
Software & Information Industry Association, Public Knowledge, and the Motion 
Picture Association of America. Id. at 934. 
 140 Brief of Amicus Curiae Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. in 
Support of Appellee’s Position Seeking Affirmance on Appeal (and Reversal on Appeal) 
at 3, MDY, 629 F.3d 928 (citing S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (1998)). 
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place. The inability to infringe by copying or distributing makes no 
difference to such a circumventor, whose goal is simply to watch the 
movie for free. Yet, the harm to the copyright owner that this type of 
conduct causes is manifest.141 
In reaching its decision, the court set forth a detailed 
construction of § 1201(a)(2) and (b)(1)142 explicitly rejecting the 
Federal Circuit’s analysis in Chamberlain.143 Acknowledging its 
appreciation for “the policy considerations expressed by the 
Federal Circuit . . . ,” the court held that “a fair reading of the 
statute (supported by legislative history) indicates that Congress 
created a distinct anti-circumvention right under § 1201(a) 
without [Chamberlain’s] infringement nexus requirement.”144  
Having rejected the nexus requirement, the court 
turned its attention to the facts of Blizzard’s DMCA claims. It 
found that in addition to the game’s source code and “discrete 
visual and audible components”145 (that is, its library of 
character images, backgrounds, and sounds), Blizzard had 
rights of exclusion under copyright law in what the district 
court had called the “real-time experience of traveling through 
different [virtual] worlds . . . and encountering other players.”146 
The court held that a player’s use of Glider did circumvent a 
technological measure that effectively controlled access to this 
copyright-protected work.147 In sum, the court found that while 
Glider did not infringe Blizzard’s copyrights, its use was 
unauthorized and within the reach of the DMCA. 
II. ACCESS RIGHT: FROM THEORY TO LAW 
As discussed above,148 under § 106 the owner of a 
copyright has the exclusive, alienable right to “reproduce the 
  
 141 Id. at 4. 
 142 Blizzard had not brought claims against any individual user, and thus no 
claim was filed alleging direct (individual) circumvention under § 1201(a)(1); however, 
because the circumvention and trafficking provisions of § 1201(a) share operative 
language, the court’s analysis here is relevant to the application of § 1201(a)(1).  
 143 MDY, 629 F.3d at 950-52. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at 942. 
 146 Id. at 942-43, 953 (quoting MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 616 F. 
Supp. 2d 958 (D. Ariz. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 147 Id. at 954-55. The court went on, however, to hold that Warden did not 
“effectively protect[] a right . . . under the Copyright Act.” Id. at 954 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Because the use of Glider did not constitute copyright infringement, 
but merely a breach of contract, MDY could not be liable under § 1201(b)(1). Id. 
 148 See supra Part I.A. 
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copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords.”149 Essential to a 
finding of infringement liability under this provision is a new 
fixation—that is, the coming into existence of a new copy.150 We 
have also seen that the owner of a copyright enjoys the 
exclusive right to publicly perform the work.151 Liability for a 
violation of this exclusivity requires a determination that a 
work has been performed, as by digital transmission, and that 
the performance was made to the public.152 
As markets for media content have moved online,153 such 
factual determinations have become increasingly formalistic 
and more detached from a fulsome inquiry into the culpability of 
the infringement defendant’s conduct and incentive-based policy 
concerns.154 Infringement liability can hinge on arcane details, 
such as whether a broadcaster employs distinct individual data 
files, a “master copy,” or a “standard data compression 
algorithm”;155 whether streaming content buffers for more than a 
“transitory” period;156 or whether multiple electronic copies of an 
on-demand transmission are stored centrally.157 Most strangely, 
different rules govern identical conduct by an alleged infringer 
depending on whether a piece of software requires temporary 
RAM reproduction.158 In short, the focus of infringement 
jurisprudence will likely continue to shift away from whether a 
particular instance of reproduction or performance should be 
discouraged on policy grounds, and toward the more difficult but 
  
 149 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006). Of course, not all new fixations are infringing. 
See supra notes 39, 67 and accompanying text (discussing fair use and the essential 
step defense). 
 150 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining copies as “material objects, other than 
phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and 
from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either 
directly or with the aid of a machine or device”).  
 151 Id. § 106(4)-(6). 
 152 See supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text. 
 153 See infra notes 184-87 and accompanying text. 
 154 See supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text. 
 155 See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3Tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 650 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 156 See, e.g., Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 128-30 
(2d Cir. 2008) (holding that recorded programming stored on a cable company’s servers 
was insufficiently “fixed” to constitute an infringing copy because it did not meet the 
Copyright Act’s durational requirement). 
 157 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 158 See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Ginsburg, supra 
note 29, at 114 (observing that “[d]igital media made the distinction [between copies 
and performances] even more dubious”); Aaron Perzanowski, Fixing RAM Copies, 104 
NW. U. L. REV. 1067, 1069-70 (2010) (tracing the RAM copy doctrine from its inception 
through Cartoon Network, and proposing a rubric for establishing the existence of a copy). 
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formalistic question of whether an infringing copy or 
performance can be established in the first place. 
The resulting difficulties were not unforeseen in 
academic circles, and the alternative that has been proposed 
was dubbed an “access right,” urged to be granted alongside—
and appurtenant to—a copyright.159 An access right is reflected 
in the Ninth Circuit’s copyright misuse and § 1201 cases, which 
validate and encourage the mutually supportive use of 
licensing and TPM. Traditional copyright law evolved to 
protect works in a tangible environment.160 An access right, on 
the other hand, is more appropriate for new content markets 
where consumers engage in an efficient, tailored transaction 
for the right to experience a work.161 
A. The Access Right in Theory 
Professor Jane Ginsburg noticed in 2003 that, as a 
result of advances in digital content distribution technology, 
“the moment of the material copy may be passing,”162 and that 
recognition of an access right—a “right to control the manner 
in which members of the public apprehend the work”—would 
become critical to the coherence of copyright law.163 Taking up 
the same project, Professor Zohar Efroni’s 2010 book on the 
subject164 examines the philosophical underpinnings of such a 
construct in detail, positing that anticircumvention laws 
represent a manifestation of an access right that is “neo-
conservative” (that is, built upon existing laws)165 and proposing 
instead a ground-up reinvention of copyright law in its image.166 
This may have been the point of copyright law all along. 
As a threshold matter, as Ginsburg suggests, “in the digital 
environment, the ‘exclusive Right’ that the Constitution 
authorizes Congress to secure to authors is not only a ‘copy’-
right, but an access right.”167 She argues that “there should be 
nothing sacred about the eighteenth- or nineteenth-century 
classifications of rights . . . in a technological world that would 
  
 159 See infra notes 166-69 and accompanying text. 
 160 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 161 See infra note 191 and accompanying text (discussing price discrimination 
benefits of an access right). 
 162 Ginsburg, supra note 29, at 115. 
 163 Id. at 120. 
 164 EFRONI, supra note 29. 
 165 Id. at 416. 
 166 Id. at 479-80 (setting forth what the author calls the “Project”). 
 167 Ginsburg, supra note 29, at 116 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
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have been utterly inconceivable to eighteenth-century minds.”168 
This is because, as Ginsburg further observes, an access right 
“was implicit in the reproduction and distribution rights under 
copyright in the days before mass market copying devices. The 
copyright owner controlled access by choosing how to make the 
work available.”169 She also notes that developments in 
copyright law that keep pace with new technology are nothing 
new. Congress, for example, established a digital performance 
right in sound recordings when it became clear that Internet 
transmission would provide both a means to create infringing 
copies and a market substitute in its own right.170 
B. Unauthorized Noninfringing Uses: How the Access Right 
Became Law 
The Ninth Circuit’s anticircumvention and licensing cases 
work together to create an access right because the 
anticircumvention cases establish that the DMCA predicates 
liability on the existence of an unauthorized use, and the licensing 
cases tell us what kinds of uses may legitimately be deemed 
unauthorized.171 Technological protective measures, it thus appears, 
provide a legal trigger for the Ninth Circuit’s access right.172  
In view of this interplay between license terms and 
TPM, the progression of the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in MDY 
suggests that the court took advantage of the defendant’s 
argument for noninfringement (and reliance on Chamberlain), 
using the dispute over online gaming as an opportunity to 
reject Chamberlain outright. Doing so then allowed the Ninth 
Circuit to establish a rule that would govern unauthorized 
  
 168 Id. at 122 (emphasis omitted). 
 169 Id. at 123 n.27 (citing Simon Olswang, Accessright: An Evolutionary Path 
for Copyright in the Digital Era?, 5 EIPR 215 (1995) (invoking the concept under 
European law)).  
 170 Id. at 124-25.  
 171 The combined effect argued here has not gone unnoticed by the academy, 
but it does not seem to have been widely commented upon. See, e.g., Reuven Ashtar, 
Licensing as Digital Rights Management, from the Advent of the Web to the iPad, 13 
YALE J.L. & TECH. 141, 154 (2011) (observing that “[t]he TPM-licensing nexus is 
apparent in later DMCA case law, but has yet to be properly studied”). 
 172 The role of TPM also extends to notice and self-help. To illustrate by 
analogy to personal property: I park my car (which, conveniently for my analogy, 
predates the DMCA) with its doors locked. This has three effects: (1) it gives the world 
notice of my exclusive claim, see Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 
RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 374 (1954) (“To the world: Keep off . . . .”); (2) it is, I hope, 
effective self-help; and (3) finally, like § 1201, it triggers liability on the part of a would-
be thief who circumvents my locks. 
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noninfringing uses in a variety of commercial settings.173 This 
may not be surprising in light of the Chamberlain court’s own 
lack of restraint in declaring unauthorized noninfringing uses 
exempt from liability.174 The MDY court, it seems, simply struck 
back with an equally broad answer to the same unasked 
question. Arguably, this was a deliberate creation of a new 
right of exclusion intended to give legal force to the boundaries 
of a user license. Unquestionably, it created a means for 
content creators to take advantage of the efficiencies that 
tailored digital distribution transactions allow without risking 
absurd results under § 106. 
The Ninth Circuit’s access right is what Professor Efroni 
would call “neo-conservative”175 because under § 1201, a valid 
copyright remains a threshold requirement.176 What copyright 
owners gain is the ability to alienate the entitlement to their 
works, by contract, with the legal protection of 
anticircumvention liability. The DMCA-based access right 
provides a cause of action that protects the access licensor, 
allowing a means to recover for violations of license terms 
without the increasingly technical reproduction and 
performance inquiries that attend infringement claims.177  
On the other hand, none of this renders traditional 
infringement rules obsolete (as Professor Efroni would 
apparently prefer).178 DMCA anticircumvention liability under 
any construction is—just like any of the exclusion rights 
conferred by § 106—never more than a right of exclusion 
appurtenant to the ownership of the copyright in the work.179 As 
such, the subject matter and durational limits of copyright 
protection180 remain threshold elements of access protection. 
Further, for as long as a market exists for tangible 
  
 173 See supra Part II.B. If the MDY court had principally been concerned with 
software—and the facts before it—it could have accepted the plaintiff’s argument that 
RAM copies made in violation of a license agreement are infringing and dispensed with 
its reliance on a covenant/condition distinction. Instead, the defendant’s pyrrhic victory 
on the question of infringement allowed the court to reach many situations in which 
unauthorized noninfringing access to media is controlled by TPM.  
 174 See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text. 
 175 See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
 176 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2006) (“No person shall circumvent a technological measure 
that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.” (emphasis added)). 
 177 See supra notes 52-69 and accompanying text. 
 178 See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
 179 See supra note 176 and accompanying text.  
 180 See HUNTER, supra note 9, at 32-41 (explaining the subject matter 
eligibility requirement under 17 U.S.C. § 102); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DURATION OF 
COPYRIGHT (Aug. 2011), available at http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ15a.pdf (“The 
provisions of copyright law dealing with duration are complex.”). 
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reproductions, § 106 will have a place. As Professor Ginsburg 
observes, certain traditional media would continue to be 
produced and monetized via tangible copies in an access 
market.181 In such circumstances, TPM may not be appropriate 
or desirable. Instead, there is no reason why §§ 106 and 109 
should not continue to define the scope of uses that can 
permissibly be made of a lawfully acquired copy.  
In each circumstance, plaintiffs can and should think 
strategically about the kind of claim that may be appropriate to 
a given set of facts. Where clear violations of the reproduction, 
distribution, and performance rights—even as to a purely 
digital copy—can be shown, infringement provides a familiar 
legal standard under which to seek relief. Where ontological 
questions blur the lines surrounding copies and performances, 
as in Capitol Records,182 plaintiffs may instead choose to rely 
solely on the DMCA. Where claims and defenses rely on 
formalisms to allege reproduction or performance, courts 
themselves may reject infringement claims altogether in favor 
of the common law access right under MDY and Psystar. 
C. Is an Access Right a Good Thing? 
Professor Ginsburg’s prescient 2003 prescription for an 
access right imagined a “near-future” content marketplace where 
content would be experienced, not possessed.183 It is clear that 
2003’s near future has arrived. It may therefore be instructive to 
briefly consider one recent marketplace initiative which—as 
Ginsburg predicted—proposes to allow users to transact for a set 
of tailored access entitlements in lieu of the right to possess a 
copy of a work or to experience a given performance. 
A recently launched digital content format called 
UltraViolet, created by a consortium of content providers and 
electronics manufacturers, allows customers to assign content 
to a cloud-based “digital locker” of music and motion-picture 
works.184 Reception has been warm, even from consumer 
  
 181 Ginsburg, supra note 29, at 116. 
 182 Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3Tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 649 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also supra text accompanying notes 53-60. 
 183 Ginsburg, supra note 29, at 116-17. 
 184 See Marc Graser, Sony, Uni, WB Set to Offer Films, TV for UV, VARIETY 
(Oct. 10, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://www.variety.com/article/VR1118044163; Michael White 
et al., Apple, Hollywood Studios Said to Discuss Movie Streaming Plan, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 13, 2011, 12:52 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-
13/apple-hollywood-studios-discuss-movie-plan.html. This consortium is similar in kind 
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advocates.185 Once the right to include a certain work (in the 
“locker”) is purchased, the user is granted a package of 
entitlements to experience the work. These entitlements may 
include the right to possess a Blu-Ray optical disk, to view the 
work encoded on that disk, to download and store the same 
work from remote servers to a portable device, or to view an on-
demand streaming performance of the work.186 Although rights 
to a “digital locker” might be granted alongside the purchase of 
a tangible copy, they might also stand alone, independent of 
possession of any material fixed copy of the work.187 In short, 
the UltraViolet consortium and others like it188 seem to offer a 
package of rights in a certain work that exists independent of 
any fixed copy and strongly resembles the transaction 
contemplated by the access right.  
Market-driven developments like UltraViolet raise the 
question of whether consumers will ultimately benefit. One 
prominent characteristic of an access-based market is its 
ability to unbundle rights like first sale, which are appurtenant 
to tangible copies, and to provide price discrimination among 
consumers with different preferences.189 Randal Picker observes 
that by employing traditional infringement rules—specifically, 
the fair use exceptions—to define the set of rights that come 
appurtenant to (by his example) a music CD,  
we are making a decision about the rights that we are bundling 
together. The nature of bundles is that everyone gets stuck buying 
the same set of rights. These bundles can be inefficiently large. 
Consumers would often be better off if instead we allowed rights to 
be unbundled, so that consumers could buy just those rights that 
they wanted . . . .190  
Efroni similarly observes that “perhaps the most 
powerful reasoning in support of TPMs” concerns “opportunities 
  
to the DVD format licensing body which governed authorized uses in Corley. See supra 
notes 102-03 and accompanying text. 
 185 See Nate Anderson, Not so Moronic: DECE DRM Finally Coming Midyear, 
ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 6, 2011, 6:23 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/ 
2011/01/not-so-moronic-dece-drm-scheme-a-big-improvement.ars (“For consumers, the 
benefits are clear: buy a movie with one DRM scheme and watch it on any device . . . . 
For the industry, the benefits are also clear: they won’t look like such morons.”).  
 186 Presumably, the right to make “fair use” of the work is implicit, if not 
widely advertised. 
 187 Theoretically, content providers would have the means to add additional 
rights to the menu: tickets to a cinema performance, the right to receive a replacement 
“hard” copy if one is damaged, and so on.  
 188 See supra note 30. 
 189 See Picker, supra note 33, at 604. 
 190 Id. 
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for price discrimination,” which can “enhance the market values 
of works” while allowing users to “enjoy a greater quantity and 
variety of works priced in a way that better matches their usage 
needs, preferences, and payment capacity.”191  
Even before technology allowed the access right to take 
shape in the law, content owners attempted to achieve the 
benefits of price discrimination by employing other means of 
downstream control. Picker observes that history reveals three 
tools for the job: legends (such as those unsuccessfully 
employed by the publisher plaintiffs in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. 
Straus192), contracts, and technology.193 In the market for digital 
content, price discrimination appeals to owners because it 
serves as a “particularly effective strategy to maximize 
revenues when the products or services show an increasing 
return on scale, when there are large fixed and sunk costs 
involved but low marginal costs, and when economics of scope 
are significant.”194 In the digital context, TPM (as both self-help 
and grounds for anticircumvention liability) become critical 
because they limit opportunities for arbitrage.195 Efroni 
acknowledges the consensus among economists that the overall 
social-welfare effects of price discrimination are ambiguous,196 
  
 191 EFRONI, supra note 29, at 404. There are three “degrees” of price 
discrimination. Id. at 406 (citing ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 
(1920)). The first, “merely a theoretical option,” occurs when goods are sold to each 
individual at the maximum price that they are willing to pay. Id. The second “allow[s] 
consumers to self-select between various options, thereby revealing their willingness to 
pay.” Id. at 407. This is the flavor of price discrimination most enabled by an access 
right. Third degree price discrimination occurs when goods are priced “according to 
assessments about the willingness to pay among the members of . . . more-or-less 
homogeneous groups.” Id. (citing HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 439-
41 (2003) (“arguing third-degree price discrimination is actually an imperfect form of 
the first degree”)). An example of third-degree discrimination occurs when “publishers 
discriminate between keen readers and price-sensitive readers who are willing to wait 
longer for the cheaper version to become available.” Id. at 408; see also Derek E. 
Bambauer, Faulty Math: The Economics of Legalizing The Grey Album, 59 ALA. L. REV. 
345, 364-67 (2008) (explaining “sell-through” differential pricing in the home video 
rental market). 
 192 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908); see also supra note 39. 
 193 Picker, supra note 33, at 606. 
 194 EFRONI, supra note 29, at 407-08. 
 195 Id. at 408 (also noting the capacity of DRM technologies to facilitate the 
collection and analysis of consumer preferences for marketing and other purposes). 
 196 Id. at 408-09; see also William W. Fisher III, When Should We Permit 
Differential Pricing of Information?, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1, 22 (2007) (“The[] primary 
claim [of economists]—about which there is no longer significant controversy—is that it 
is impossible to say, in the abstract, whether price discrimination increases or 
decreases aggregate social welfare.”). 
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but, for the present, the industry and consumers appear to be 
embracing this model of content distribution.197  
The Ninth Circuit’s access right provides a legal 
framework for this model, avoiding the strained factual 
analysis common to claims brought under § 106. Jeffrey 
Malkan argues, for example, that the individual remote copy 
which precluded public performance liability for Cablevision in 
Cartoon Network was dubious, insinuating that “[t]his 
contrivance makes one wonder whether there really will be a 
personal copy behind each RS-DVR transmission or whether, to 
the contrary, the concept of the personal copy serves 
Cablevision as a metaphor that actually signifies a prepaid 
right of access to performances of the work.”198 He notes that 
three years later,  
the Wall Street Journal speculated that the studios might eventually 
agree to allow Cablevision and others to forgo the storage of personal RS-
DVR copies—the very condition upon which the Second Circuit had based 
its decision . . .—if Cablevision would put curbs on ad-skipping technology 
and allow the studios to refresh their ads on the programming.199 
The Ninth Circuit’s access right—that is, its treatment 
of licensing and anticircumvention—refocuses the liability 
analysis on the conduct of the defendant and the copyright 
bargain. Conduct that invades the market incentive of the 
copyright holder can be proscribed, relieving plaintiffs of the 
need to resort to formalistic § 106 claims. Where a form of 
digital protection, such as a scrambled broadcast signal, 
restricts access to a copyrighted work, the act of circumventing 
it, like sneaking into a virtual movie theater, invades an access 
right.200 Indeed, the Blizzard case itself demonstrates that the 
Ninth Circuit’s approach is not limited to protecting 
reproduction or performance rights: because Warden controlled 
access only to the “dynamic non-literal elements” of the game—
in other words, live game play—the court’s § 1201(a) analysis 
did not pause to consider whether a copy of that specific work 
was ever copied onto a player’s computer, giving rise to even a 
colorable argument for infringement under § 106.201  
  
 197 See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text. 
 198 Malkan, supra note 60, at 527-28 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted). 
 199 Id. at 527 n.82 (emphasis omitted). 
 200 See, e.g., Echostar Satellite LLC v. Viewtech, Inc., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d 1757 
(S.D. Cal. 2011) (granting summary judgment for § 1201 plaintiff, a satellite television 
provider, where defendants facilitated unscrambling of a broadcast signal). 
 201 MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that defendant’s circumvention technology allowed access to on-line game play).  
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III. NECESSARY LIMITS 
Despite the rhetoric often attending the licensing and 
anticircumvention cases in the broader context of the 
“copyright wars,”202 the salient question is not whether an 
access right can be found in the Ninth Circuit’s law, or even 
whether such a regime is inherently desirable. The better 
question, which ought to concern stakeholders on both sides of 
the debate, is precisely which unauthorized noninfringing uses 
ought to be subject to an access right and, alternatively, which 
of these ought to be beyond the reach of an expanded copyright-
like regime for policy reasons (like those supporting fair use). 
This part, therefore, aims to resolve the tension between MDY 
and Chamberlain, both of which staked out ambitious and 
uncompromising claims on the DMCA’s applicability to 
unauthorized noninfringing use.203  
Scholars have long argued that certain affirmative 
defenses to infringement ought to be preserved as affirmative 
defenses to § 1201(a).204 These are valid but incomplete 
arguments, since they tend not to address noninfringing use. It 
is important to remember that the Ninth Circuit’s approach to 
an access right has a built-in prima facie limit: because use 
that is authorized cannot violate the DMCA, a valid license 
provides a prima facie defense to anticircumvention liability. 
Anticircumvention laws, in short, can reach no further than 
valid license restrictions.205 It might also be argued that 
anticircumvention and licensing have a symbiotic relationship. 
Licensing provides the necessary “unauthorized” element of 
DMCA liability, and TPM provide self-help, notice, and a legal 
prophylaxis for license restrictions.206 The most complete 
approach to normative questions about the scope of an access 
right can thus be found in the licensing cases, which apply the 
doctrine of copyright misuse to sketch boundaries in surprising 
accord with the policy considerations that have animated 
copyright law all along. 
  
 202 See generally PATRY, supra note 106. 
 203 It is the conflicting policy—if any—expressed in those cases that requires 
resolution in shaping an access right. Doctrinally, as well, the tension between MDY 
and Chamberlain has created difficulties for other courts. See supra note 121 
(discussing the treatment of Chamberlain in other Circuits, including the Fifth 
Circuit’s withdrawal of its decision in MGE). 
 204 See generally Armstrong, supra note 112; see also Ginsburg, supra note 29, 
at 125-31.  
 205 See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 206 See supra note 171. 
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A. Affirmative Defenses: The Preservation of Fair Use 
Under an Access Right 
Fair use is a judge-made affirmative defense to 
copyright infringement that was codified in § 107 of the 
Copyright Act.207 Under this doctrine, certain activities that 
require a user to duplicate, distribute, or reproduce protected 
works “such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching . . . , scholarship, or research” do not give rise to 
liability.208 Thus, fair use defines the very contours of copyright 
liability by carving away at the exclusive rights granted by 
§ 106, and its scope is among the central debates in copyright 
law.209 Fair use is governed by a four-factor test210 that, it has 
been argued, is principally concerned with permitting conduct 
that does not erode the creator’s incentive by creating a 
substitute for the work in the marketplace.211  
The absence of the fair use defense under 
anticircumvention laws was an early concern of the DMCA’s 
critics, and this concern was echoed by early defendants faced 
with § 1201 liability.212 The Corley court took a narrow view of 
the rights conferred by § 107 on prospective fair users, 
reasoning that the anticircumvention provisions did  
not impose even an arguable limitation on the opportunity to make a 
variety of traditional fair uses of DVD movies, such as commenting 
  
 207 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 208 Id. 
 209 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (rejecting challenge to 
legislative extension of copyright duration under the “limited times” requirement, U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, and the First Amendment). 
 210 17 U.S.C. § 107 (requiring courts to consider “(1) the purpose and character 
of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) 
the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work”).  
 211 See HUNTER, supra note 9, at 72 (citing Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841)); accord 4-13 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05, at 13-198.2 (“If one 
looks to the fair use cases . . . this emerges as the most important, and indeed, central 
fair use factor.” (footnotes omitted)). This emphasis is most acute in the context of 
derivative works. See HUNTER, supra note 9, at 73 (noting that while market 
substitution “cuts directly against the incentive justification” for copyright protection, 
there is a judicial trend toward overprotection where derivative works are concerned); 
Bambauer, supra note 191, at 394 (noting that copyright law should “address creators’ 
primary fear of derivatives substituting for sales of the original”); see also Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (famously extending the fair use defense to 
commercial parody). 
 212 See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 458 (2d Cir. 
2001) (rejecting the “extravagant claim” that the DMCA as applied to the dispute at 
bar “eliminates fair use”). 
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on their content, quoting excerpts from their screenplays, and even 
recording portions of the video images and sounds on film or tape by 
pointing a camera, a camcorder, or a microphone at a monitor as it 
displays the DVD movie. . . . Fair use has never been held to be a 
guarantee of access to copyrighted material in order to copy it by the 
fair user’s preferred technique . . . .213  
In other words, the court did not view § 107 as creating an 
entitlement to access a work in every circumstance where 
prima facie infringement would be justified by fair use.214 To 
understand this approach, it is critical to remember that 
despite widespread imprecision in the term’s use by scholars 
and judges,215 a use of copyright-protected material cannot be a 
“fair use” unless it is also a prima facie violation of § 106.  
But since many § 1201 violations do involve an 
otherwise infringing fair use,216 the concern with § 1201’s 
impact on fair use has provided a useful framework for a 
broader discussion about the scope of noninfringing uses that 
should be immune (the exercise that this note argues is the 
most critical to the legitimacy of an access right).  
Randall Picker imagines three regimes for the 
interaction of fair use and access rules (by analogy to tangible 
media): a regime where the infringement defense and the 
legality of access are independent inquiries,217 a regime where 
“we would take into account how access was obtained and limit 
  
 213 Id. at 459. 
 214 Id. In a more basic illustration, Randall Picker explains that just because a 
copyrightable poem has been written on a piece of paper, “[t]hird parties have no right 
to access to the paper, no right to insist that I publish the work and somehow make it 
available to everyone.” Picker, supra note 33, at 604; accord David R. Johnstone, 
Debunking Fair Use Rights and Copyduty Under U.S. Copyright Law, 52 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC’Y U.S.A. 345, 367 (2005) (“One searches the [copyright law] in vain for a cognizable 
‘copyduty’ owed to users in conjunction with the fair use doctrine and policy.” (citing 
Lawrence Lessig, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Copyright? Round 1: Opening 
Remarks, ATL. ONLINE (Sept. 10, 1998), http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/forum/ 
copyright/lessig1.htm)). More to the point, fair use under § 107 had not been alleged by 
the appellants in Corley, see 273 F.3d at 459 (“Appellants do not claim to be making 
fair use of any copyrighted materials . . . .”), and would not be in subsequent leading 
cases. See, e.g., MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 950 n.12 (9th Cir. 
2010) (“Like the Chamberlain court, we need not and do not reach the relationship 
between fair use . . . and violations of § 1201. MDY has not claimed that Glider use is a 
‘fair use’ of WoW’s dynamic non-literal elements. Accordingly, we too leave open the 
question . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 215 See Johnstone, supra note 214, at 346-47; see also Picker, supra note 33, at 
605 (“All [fair use] does is provide that certain uses that otherwise would be infringing 
will not be infringing, meaning that the remedies that copyright creates won’t apply 
through copyright. This isn’t some broad ‘right’ to fair use, though fair use is often 
addressed in those terms by many, including myself on past occasions.”). 
 216 See infra note 226 and accompanying text. 
 217 Picker, supra note 33, at 610-11. 
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usual fair use because of the way in which access was 
obtained,”218 and finally a regime where “the use would not be 
copyright infringement because it would be fair to trump the 
punishment that could attach to the method used to acquire 
access.”219 Picker is “skeptical” about the third regime, because 
“burglars would go into blogging in a big way: steal stuff, be 
sure to take a book as well, and then blog a review of the 
book.”220 This bricks-and-mortar illustration is as compelling as 
it is amusing, insofar as it responds to fair use as a complete 
defense to access violations, but Professor Timothy Armstrong 
has called for at least some leeway for fair users in the context 
of anticircumvention laws. Armstrong recently argued that a 
judge-made affirmative defense to § 1201, modeled on § 107, 
may provide an appropriate way to limit anticircumvention 
liability where public policy demands it.221 For example, he 
argues that judges might consider the second of § 107’s four 
factors222 to “usefully differentiate between circumvention aimed 
at . . . a creative, expressive work [e.g., the movies in Corley] . . . 
and circumvention that merely enables access to less expressive, 
more utilitarian works (as in Chamberlain . . . ).”223 Similarly, 
citing the first and fourth fair use factors, he urges courts to 
distinguish between cases in which circumvention “provide[s] a 
complete substitute for authorized purchases of an expressive 
work [as in Corley] . . . , and cases in which circumvention 
merely exposes a maker of consumer products to additional 
marketplace competition (as in Chamberlain . . . ).”224  
Armstrong suggests that courts may already have taken 
it upon themselves to import fair use principles into DMCA 
cases: “[C]ases like Chamberlain . . . do seem to draw upon 
matters of . . . policy . . . to give the DMCA quite a different 
reading than did cases like [Corley]. Perhaps the courts are 
silently thinking ‘fair circumvention’ thoughts, while outwardly 
preserving a facade of formalist orthodoxy . . . .”225 Whether and 
to what extent acts of circumvention, undertaken to facilitate 
the “fair use” of protected works, ought to be excused from 
liability remains an open and important question. But this note 
  
 218 Id. at 611. 
 219 Id. 
 220 Id. 
 221 See Armstrong, supra note 112, at 42-44. 
 222 See supra note 210.  
 223 Armstrong, supra note 112, at 45. 
 224 Id. (footnote omitted).  
 225 Id. at 50. 
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attempts to pick up where Professor Armstrong left off, because 
in attempting to define the appropriate contours of an access 
right, to end the inquiry there begs the question. It is 
important, instead, to recognize that a wide swath of previously 
lawful conduct would not be exempt from access protection 
under a fair use carve-out. In other words, the protection of fair 
uses does not overlap with the unauthorized noninfringing uses 
protected by the Chamberlain nexus. 
Professor Armstrong does acknowledge “the problem of 
circumvention undertaken for noninfringing purposes,” but his 
illustrative hypothetical nevertheless describes a prima facie 
infringing fair use.226 Thus, while acknowledging that 
traditional fair use defenses might not serve as the “outer 
boundary” of a fair circumvention defense,227 Professor 
Armstrong admits that his normative proposition is “less 
ambitious” than any position attempting to define such a 
boundary.228 As such, his normative proposal does not quite 
confront the full spectrum of newly unlawful activity that has 
concerned other scholars in the decade since Corley and that 
are the focus of this note.229  
Ultimately, Armstrong’s prescription for a judge-made 
affirmative defense to § 1201(a) establishes a useful 
framework for limiting the scope of an access right, but his 
prescription more narrowly reflects that of the Chamberlain 
court. Indeed, relying on the legislative history of the DMCA, 
he argues at base that anticircumvention liability should be 
linked to infringement.230 Two years hence, as we have seen, 
the Ninth Circuit has made clear that opponents of an access 
right will have no such luck.231 As it stands, then, the question of 
which unauthorized noninfringing uses should be subject to an 
access right in light of copyright’s constitutional bargain232 remains 
in need of attention.  
  
 226 Id. at 46-47 (supposing liability for the educational copying of a DVD). 
 227 Id. at 47. 
 228 Id. 
 229 See, e.g., John Tehranian, Parchment, Pixels, & Personhood: User Rights 
and the IP (Identity Politics) of IP (Intellectual Property), 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 76 
(2011) (“[I]t is not just ‘fair uses’ of copyrighted works (i.e., violations of section 106 
rights excused under the fair use doctrine) that the DMCA anti-circumvention 
provisions implicate. By keeping copyrighted works under a digital lock that limits 
their uses specifically to those for which rights holders provide approval, the DMCA 
anti-circumvention provisions also create liability for certain acts of possession and 
private use that did not run afoul of section 106 in the first place.”).  
 230 Armstrong, supra note 112, at 47.  
 231 See supra text accompanying note 15. 
 232 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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B. Prima Facie Defenses: Which Noninfringing Uses May 
Owners “Unauthorize”?  
1. First Sale and Consumer Expectations 
The search for an inherent (prima facie) limit to an 
access right begins with its focus on unauthorized noninfringing 
conduct. In other words, the scope of an access right is defined 
by the extent of noninfringing conduct that the copyright holder 
may deem unauthorized. Questions about the extent to which 
copyright owners may restrain alienation are not new, nor are 
they unique to the digital environment. Authors and publishers 
of tangible works once attempted to set resale prices by using 
“legends.”233 Such downstream control of a lawfully acquired 
copy was quickly reined in by the first sale doctrine, however.234 
First sale has a number of well-recognized, inherent benefits 
that have prompted calls for its preservation in digital 
markets.235 First, it “improves both the affordability and 
availability of copyrighted works by fostering secondary 
markets for lawful copies,” such as used bookstores.236 It also 
“enables preservation of public access to works that are no 
longer available from the copyright owner”237 and protects 
consumer privacy because “consumers can transfer works 
without permission of the copyright holder.”238 Finally, “first 
sale promotes market efficiency and transactional clarity by 
protecting consumers from high information and transaction 
costs and deceptively complex limitations on the use of low-cost 
copyrighted goods.”239 In other words, there is no need to haggle 
over the bundle of content-related rights appurtenant to a 
book. Instead, what you see is what you get. 
First sale applies only to sold copies. Thus, to whatever 
extent licensing and anticircumvention rules provide alternatives 
to the sale of a copy, they erode the impact of the doctrine. 
  
 233 Picker, supra note 33, at 606 (explaining “legends”). 
 234 See HUNTER, supra note 9, at 50-51; see also Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 
U.S. 339 (1908) (establishing the doctrine); 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2006) (codifying same) (“[T]he 
owner of a particular copy . . . is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to 
sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
 235 Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 93, at 894-97.  
 236 Id. at 894. 
 237 Id. at 895. 
 238 Id. at 896. 
 239 Id. (predicting prohibitive transaction costs if “each physical copy of the 
latest Twilight novel or Lady Gaga CD came with a slightly different set of 
idiosyncratic copyright permissions” resulting in a “fragmented and confusing 
constellation of terms and restrictions”).  
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Increasingly, digital content is placed in the market and 
monetized with customized restraints on its use and subsequent 
transfer.240 While its inherent advantages suggest that first sale 
may deserve some protection in this setting, the question 
becomes whether and when it should give way to alternatives. In 
short, whether first sale matters can more fundamentally be 
viewed as part of a broader inquiry: to what extent must 
consumer expectations be protected in a content transaction?241  
Anecdotally, where new business models have been in 
phase with consumer expectations, they have been warmly 
embraced.242 It is not surprising that disputes arise when a 
consumer transaction defies the reasonable expectations of a 
party. In Corley, for example, the circumvention technology in 
question was developed to allow content purchasers to exercise 
rights they believed themselves entitled to but which had been 
restricted by DRM.243  
Nevertheless, consumer acquiescence in the erosion of 
first sale does not seem to placate its defenders. Some 
objections are theoretical: Public Knowledge, a nonprofit users’ 
rights advocate and amicus for the defendant in MDY, 
emphasized that first sale “reflect[s] long-established common 
law principles, such as the disfavor shown to restraints on 
  
 240 See, e.g., supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text. 
 241 First sale doctrine concerns the expectations of consumers as to their 
possessory rights in a tangible fixation of a work. The owner’s rights as to the work 
appurtenant to ownership of that copy remained constrained by § 106. The buyer of a 
book, therefore, gains certain rights as to the book, and certain rights as to the work 
expressed therein, but neither set of rights is unlimited. See supra Part I.A. 
 242 One practitioner has pointed out that unlike its less successful competitors, 
“iTunes has been so successful because the DRM terms are transparent to the habitual 
consumer and unlikely to be reached through normal user activities.” Eric Matthew 
Hinkes, Access Controls in the Digital Era and the Fair Use/First Sale Doctrines, 23 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 685, 723 (2007). Hinkes lauds this 
approach as a “market balance without specific government intervention where the 
wants of consumers match the needs of the content providers.” Id. at 726; but cf. 
JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT 3 (2008) 
(concluding that the iPhone, the now-ubiquitous Apple product, is “sterile” because 
users “are not allowed to add programs to the all-in-one device”). 
 243 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 444 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(noting the defendant-appellants’ argument that the “individual who buys a DVD has 
the ‘authority of the copyright owner’ to view the DVD, and therefore is exempted from 
the DMCA . . . when the buyer circumvents an encryption technology in order to view 
the DVD on a competing platform (such as Linux)”). It is also worth noting that as with 
the SLA at issue in Psystar, there had been no impact on the user’s rights in the DVD 
itself. In fact, the technology had not even placed barriers in the way of duplication. 
The CSS encryption had simply placed limits on the manner in which the DVD’s owner 
could access the expressive work encoded on the DVD. Because consumer distribution 
formats had never before been subject to format licensing, platform-specific playback 
was not a familiar limitation. See id. at 436-37 (explaining the movie industry’s 
introduction of CSS in 1997). 
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alienation for personal property and equitable servitudes 
imposed on chattel.”244 Practical objections to the transition 
from first sale to customized entitlements, on the other hand, 
are surprisingly strained. One otherwise well-reasoned 
criticism sounds the alarm by imagining the lost work of a 
legendary—but fictional—New Zealand cinema director released 
only on single-play DVD.245 Nevertheless, the rights appurtenant 
to a tangible copy (first sale rights) have become enshrined in our 
expectations, and commentators concerned about the changes 
attending the digital marketplace seem most concerned about the 
disappearance of that familiar set of rights.246 Something is 
indeed comforting about the notion that possessing a physical 
thing creates a set of access rights that are coterminous with 
physical property rights; this is an easily understood scope of 
entitlements. It is therefore no surprise that historically, as § 106 
was applied to digital and then to intangible media,247 there 
emerged no public enthusiasm for its retirement.248  
But as it becomes increasingly difficult to perceive the 
situs of a copy, and as consumer desire for convenience drives 
content to the cloud, any insistence upon limiting content 
transactions to the contours of § 109 will prove futile and likely 
counterproductive. The results in Vernor and Psystar reflect 
this reality: customized, price-discriminatory access-based 
transactions are in, and first sale is out.249 Therefore, what is 
  
 244 Brief of Amicus Curiae Public Knowledge in Support of Reversal, supra 
note 133, at 5 (citing Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908)). This argument, 
in the context of the dispute then at bar, was principally concerned with extending the 
“essential step” defense to software licensees. Ironically, the court did take 
infringement off the table for software end-user licensees, but only en route to an 
interpretation of § 1201(a) that would have equally strong implications for first sale. 
See generally supra Part I.C.4. 
 245 JOHN TEHRANIAN, INFRINGEMENT NATION: COPYRIGHT 2.0 AND YOU 88 
(2011). Such systems have existed, but have rarely gained market traction. See, e.g., 
Margaret Kane, Divx Dies—DVD the Big Winner, ZDNET (June 16, 1999, 3:00 AM), 
http://www.zdnet.com/news/divx-dies-dvd-the-big-winner/102560 (reporting that studios 
and consumers alike rejected Circuit City’s proprietary limited-play video disc offering).  
 246 See generally Fred von Lohmann, First Sale, Why It Matters, Why We’re Fighting 
for It, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 9, 2007), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2007/ 
08/first-sale-why-it-matters-why-were-fighting-it. 
 247 See supra Part I.A. 
 248 In fact, after the passage of the DMCA, some legislators moved to protect 
legacy consumer expectations in the digital marketplace. See MATTHEW RIMMER, 
DIGITAL COPYRIGHT AND THE CONSUMER REVOLUTION: HANDS OFF MY IPOD 182-83 
(2007) (discussing the proposed 2003 Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act and Benefit 
Authors without Limiting Advancement or Net Consumer Expectations (BALANCE) 
Act, neither of which won “support from the Congress as a whole”).  
 249 See supra notes 81, 91 and accompanying text. 
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required is a principled approach to the protection of consumer 
expectations under MDY and Psystar. 
One final word on first sale: owners and users who wish 
to recreate first sale transactions of digital media may do so. In 
the first instance, the bundle of sticks accompanying tangible 
media like DVDs and books is still fixed by Bobbs-Merrill and 
§ 109.250 In the realm of intangible distribution, in those situations 
where a transaction resembling first sale makes sense, it may 
survive simply because parties are at liberty to transact for it.251 In 
contrast, where first sale does not reflect the appropriate scope of 
entitlements, the appropriate question should not be whether first 
sale is inherently necessary to a fair marketplace but instead 
should be simply how to protect expectations.252  
2. Unauthorized Noninfringing Uses: Who Decides? 
Under the combination of §§ 106 (exclusions), 107 (fair 
use), and 109 (first sale), the contours of permissible 
transactions involving a copyrighted work reflect the bargain 
between owners and the public, and aim to preserve the 
incentive to create and publish.253 Within those boundaries, 
market forces determine what kinds of works will be created and 
on what terms they will be distributed.254 The public thus 
(theoretically) determines the amount of available works both by 
participating in the market and by democratically adjusting the 
contours of the copyright law.  
An unfettered access right would represent a regulatory 
framework in which more kinds of transactions are possible. It 
would provide ways to monetize creative works while avoiding 
the above-mentioned limits familiar in copyright law. Because 
  
 250 See supra note 237 and accompanying text. 
 251 For an example of an a la carte digital rights transaction, see supra text 
accompanying note 186. 
 252 There are, for example, valid concerns that consumers may disregard 
license terms they view as “unlikely to become relevant in their use of the product” 
which counsels “reducing contract length, simplifying and standardizing language, and 
developing ratings that would convey the essence of terms . . . .” Florencia Marotta-
Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the Recommendations of the ALI’s 
“Principles of the Law of Software Contracts,” 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 168-69 (2011) 
(recommending consumer protections under EULAs as alternatives to compulsory 
disclosure); but see Michael P. Matesky, II, Note, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
and Noninfringing Use: Can Mandatory Labeling of Digital Media Products Keep the 
Sky from Falling?, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 515, 532-38 (2005) (arguing that mandatory 
disclosure would protect consumer expectations). 
 253 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.  
 254 See supra note 191 (discussing second degree price discrimination). 
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the § 1201(a) tort, like that of § 106, thereby creates a statutory 
monopoly out of whole cloth, its scope must remain consistent 
with the Progress Clause. In exploring the proper boundaries of 
an access right, the previous sections acknowledged the need to 
make accommodations for transformative and other fair use, 
and asked whether first sale should be preserved (either 
because it reflects existing consumer expectations or because it 
inherently reflects the terms of the copyright bargain by 
enabling the existence of secondary markets, libraries, and the 
like). It was argued that consumer expectations will generally 
align with legal norms and that if first sale is important, it is 
for the latter reason.  
Except to the extent that the availability of a digital “fig 
leaf” might lead to market scarcity of public domain works,255 
certain basic limitations on copyright are imported wholesale 
by the DMCA. The “limited times” and subject matter 
requirements of copyright are a threshold requirement for 
DMCA liability.256 Moreover, the fact that contractual license 
terms govern anticircumvention liability means that fraud and 
unconscionability will continue to provide an outer boundary, 
providing additional good news for skeptics on the matter.257  
  
 255 See Ginsburg, supra note 29, at 126-27 (pointing out that public domain 
material might become eligible for § 1201 protection “so long as the information 
provider does not merely encrypt raw public domain documents or unoriginal listings of 
information, but instead packages the information with copyrightable trappings”); see 
also Pamela Samuelson, The Constitutional Law of Intellectual Property After Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 547, 568-73 (2003). This argument was noted 
but not decided in Corley. Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 444-45 (2d 
Cir. 2001). It has been rejected by the Northern District of California. See 321 Studios 
v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004); United 
States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002). This may be in part 
because, as Ginsburg seems to imply, an access right only impacts the availability of 
public domain material to the extent that it drives unprotected copies out of the 
marketplace: examining possible affirmative defenses to an access right, she argues 
that perhaps “[w]hen unprotected copies are no longer available, it should be 
permissible, once access to a copy of the work has been lawfully obtained, to circumvent 
any protection attached to the thin copyright veneer in order to access and copy the 
raw information.” Ginsburg, supra note 29, at 130 & n.54 (emphasis added) (drawing 
analogy to other provisions of § 1201 which permit circumvention necessary to create 
interoperable software). Professor Efroni points out that this concern is not unique to 
digital distribution, and simply requires additional scrutiny under an access right. See 
EFRONI, supra note 19 at 485-86. He suggests, for example, that a “strikingly 
disproportional” ratio of unprotected content within a “digital envelope” might trigger 
an affirmative defense. Id. at 509 n.97. Finally, as the Corley court suggested, fair use 
is only impacted by an access right when the right kind of access is not granted. See 
supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text. 
 256 See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 257 See Nancy S. Kim, The Software Licensing Dilemma, 2008 B.Y.U. L. REV. 
1103, 1123-28 (2008). 
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The remaining question becomes whether (or which) 
additional exceptions to an access right are necessary to ensure 
that it reflects the bargain. One possible answer is that market 
participants are also political participants, and it seems 
reasonable to assume that the terms of a statutory monopoly, 
enacted by a representative legislature, are entitled to some 
presumption of inherent balance.258 To assume so, however, 
would be to ignore the reality of the political distortions that 
attended the enactment of the DMCA.259 This may be 
unavoidable. In their influential 2003 book, William Landes 
and Judge Richard Posner suggest that an asymmetry of value 
inherent in the expanded protection of creative works gives rise 
to a political distortion in which legislatures are more likely to 
protect the interests of content owners than of content users.260 
The alternative is to accept that judges are better positioned to 
enforce the bargain,261 which would represent a return to 
copyright misuse as a prima facie judge-made limit on the 
Ninth Circuit’s version of an access right.  
C. Psystar and Market Substitution: What Chamberlain 
Was Really About 
Accepting that the Ninth Circuit’s licensing and 
anticircumvention cases created an access right, there exists a 
lingering need for clarity on the limits of this right as applied to 
unauthorized noninfringing uses. At first blush, Chamberlain 
seems to offer little in the way of clarity because the Federal 
Circuit’s “nexus” requirement remains a doctrinal outlier.262 It may 
  
 258 See Raymond T. Nimmer, Information Wars and the Challenges of Content 
Protection in Digital Contexts, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 825, 855-56 (2011) (“In 
practice, the efficacy of both the DMCA restrictions and contract terms in supporting 
value in copyrighted works are subject to practical questions of enforceability and 
market acceptability. Access controls or contractual use restrictions that are generally 
unacceptable in the market will not long be sustainable. In addition, if unacceptable to 
the broader society, they may be unenforceable in fact. As with copyright itself, these 
legal regimes create important rights, but also are tools to shape social and market 
expectations and which shape them in turn.”). 
 259 See LITMAN, supra note 19, at 122-50. 
 260 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 403 (2003) (also noting “eddies” in this current where 
content owners are also derivative creators).  
 261 See generally Armstrong, supra note 112 (arguing for a judge-made 
affirmative defense to DMCA liability). Judges may also be better able to reflect economic 
efficiencies than are legislatures. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 260, at 417. 
 262 See supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing Chamberlain); see 
also supra note 121 and accompanying text (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s avoidance of 
the question in MGE); but see Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 544 U.S. 
923 (2005) (denying certiorari). 
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be, however, that clues to the proper scope and limits of the access 
right—that is, of copyright misuse—are hiding in plain sight 
within the superficial tension between Chamberlain and MDY. In 
other words, if the MDY court correctly disregarded the Federal 
Circuit’s infringement nexus, the question remains as to whether 
the outcome of Chamberlain—as a policy matter—was correct on 
its facts. The answer is probably yes: to whatever extent an 
unfettered access right makes sense in the context of online gaming 
and digital distribution of entertainment content,263 even the MDY 
court itself acknowledged that the policy considerations expressed 
in Chamberlain were sound in the context of durable goods.264 
What emerges in the anticircumvention jurisprudence is 
a false conflict. This may be true in part because the part of 
Chamberlain that was rejected was dicta.265 But that observation 
does not tell the whole story, because, by failing to distinguish or 
confine Chamberlain, the MDY court left two important 
questions unresolved. First, what rule governs a durable goods 
case in the “Hollywood Circuit?”266 Second, and more importantly, 
in what other situations should courts apply Chamberlain’s only 
necessary holding that, because of the need to limit copyright 
owners’ rights under their bargain with the public,267 some uses 
of copyright-protected material are not within the discretion of 
the owner to “unauthorize” for the purposes of § 1201(a)? 
The answer to the first question may surprise: 
Chamberlain would have come out the same way under a 
careful application of today’s Ninth Circuit law. The necessary 
part of Chamberlain’s holding was that despite the plaintiff’s 
ex post accusation of circumvention, the use at issue had not 
been expressly made unauthorized.268 By presuming authorized 
access in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the court 
exempted a broad category of operating software use from 
DMCA liability before even asking whether infringement had 
taken place (which it had not). That portion of the holding is 
  
 263 About which reasonable minds can, and most certainly do, disagree. 
 264 MDY Indus., L.L.C. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 950 (9th Cir. 
2010) (“While we appreciate the policy considerations expressed by the Federal Circuit 
in Chamberlain, we are unable to follow its approach because it is contrary to the plain 
language of the statute.”). 
 265 See supra text accompanying note 119.  
 266 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1521 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(Kosinski, J., dissenting) (famously acknowledging the extent to which the Ninth 
Circuit must consider the pragmatic interests of the media content industries). 
 267 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 268 Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Tech., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1187-88, 1204 
(Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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not in tension with MDY and Psystar. In other words, the 
Ninth Circuit can readily adopt the principle that where 
copyright-protected software happens to be integral to a 
consumer electronic product, customers and competitors enjoy 
a presumption of de jure authority to use and market 
interoperable products. But if and when savvy manufacturers 
attempt to contract around this presumption, a more difficult 
question arises: what limit to place on the discretion of parties 
seeking to restrict such use by contract? Regrettably, the Ninth 
Circuit did not provide a clear road map in Psystar.269 As a 
threshold matter, traditional doctrines of unconscionability and 
consumer fraud are once again the outer boundaries.270 Such 
concerns are particularly acute in the context of “clickwrap” 
licensing and should guard the door to DMCA liability where a 
form of access is made unauthorized by adhesion, especially 
where consumer expectations may not align with the terms of 
the transaction.271 We are left with the affirmative defense of 
copyright misuse, the contours of which have only begun to be 
defined. For the access right described (and cautiously 
advocated) herein to become a coherent addition to the United 
States’ copyright regime, courts should continue to give it shape. 
CONCLUSION 
This note posits that an access right has been created by 
the Ninth Circuit’s software-licensing and anticircumvention 
jurisprudence, and that this right is a necessary companion to 
copyright in a digital market where the exclusive rights of 
§ 106 are often incoherent. In attempting to suggest necessary 
limits on this new right, the copyright misuse doctrine 
developed in Psystar is at the center of the inquiry. This 
doctrine requires additional clarity from the courts. In the 
meantime, perhaps a return to first principles is needed. The 
Progress Clause “secur[es]” to creators “the exclusive Right” to 
their work, but leaves the scope of that Right to the Congress 
and the common law.272 In construing and applying the DMCA 
and the Copyright Act in a digital context, courts must 
therefore secure only those rights necessary “[t]o promote the 
  
 269 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 92, at *5-10 (attempting to distill 
a unifying principle governing copyright misuse among the Circuit Courts of Appeal). 
 270 See supra note 257 and accompanying text. 
 271  See id.  
 272 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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Progress of Science and useful Arts.”273 This note argues that 
market substitution—the fourth fair use factor—may be the 
dispositive one.274 In a price-discriminatory access market, 
every form of access can be bargained for. Courts shaping an 
access right, as ultimately delimited by the doctrine of 
copyright misuse, should thus consider whether the right in 
question would realistically impact the incentive to create. For 
the present, courts may need to feel their way through these 
issues. Did Chamberlain stop making garage-door openers in 
the face of competition from Skylink? It seems not.275 But 
Apple’s incentives would surely change in the face of a legal 
requirement that OS X be interoperable with third-party 
hardware. Finally, would movie studios continue to offer DVDs 
if they were unable to control the platforms on which DVDs are 
played? That may be a surprisingly close question.276 But it is 
the kind of question that will have to be asked if the Progress 
Clause is to continue to guide our intellectual property 
paradigm under an access right. 
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